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PURPOSES-CarlsbergResources Corp. v. Cambria Savings &

Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
A limited partnership, Carlsberg Mobile Home Properties, Ltd.,
(Carlsberg),' asserted the existence of diversity of citizenship 2
through its general partner, Carlsberg Resources Corp., 3 in order to
litigate its negligence action 4 against Cambria Savings and Loan AsI Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880, 881 (W.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977); Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1255 (3d Cir. 1977). Carlsberg was formed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Uniform Limited Partnership Act. See 413 F.Supp. at 882; 59 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 501 to 545 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). This Act defines a limited partnership as one
formed by two or more persons under the provisions of section 512 (relating to
formation), having as members one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partners as such shall not be bound by the obligations
of the partnership.
59 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). The members of Carlsberg
included one general partner and over 1500 limited partners. 413 F. Supp. at 882.
2 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1255 (3d Cir.
1977); Brief for Appellant at 24, Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 554
F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]; see Carlsberg Resources
Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880, 881 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d
1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
3 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880, 881 (W.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977); see 59 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 545 (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (providing that "[a] contributor, unless he is [a] general partner, is not a
proper party to proceedings by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce a
limited partner's right against or liability to the partnership"). Thus, the general partner in the
Carlsberg limited partnership is the only member of the association having capacity to sue or be
sued on the limited partnership's behalf. Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1265 (3d Cir. 1977).
4 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880, 884--85
(W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977). The negligence action arose from a
purchase-leaseback transaction between Carlsberg as purchaser-lessor and Forest Park as sellerlessee. As part of the transaction, Carlsberg required Forest Park to complete construction of a
mobile home park on the leased property. Id. at 884. Before the purchase-leaseback transaction,
Forest Park had encumbered the title to the property by executing a mortgage in favor of
Cambria Savings and Loan Association as security for a loan granted by Cambria to expand the
mobile home park. Id. The loan agreement stipulated that Cambria would disburse loan funds
in proportion to the amount of construction completed. Id. Carlsberg did not assume the
mortgage and the purchase-leaseback agreement contemplated that Forest Park would pay for
and complete the expansion of the park. Id. Forest Park defaulted on both the lease and loan
agreements by failing to complete expansion of the park. Id. at 885. Cambria violated the loan
stipulation by distributing loan funds in excess of the amount of construction completed. Id.
After Cambria initiated foreclosure proceedings and bought the property, Carlsberg instituted
this negligence suit against Cambria. Id.; Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 2.
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sociation 5 in federal court. Carlsberg argued that the court, in determining jurisdiction, should only look to the citizenship of its general partner. 6 Since Carlsberg's general partner held its citizenship
in California, 7 and the defendant, Cambria, was a citizen of Pennsylvania, 8 Carlsberg alleged that federal jurisdiction existed over the action by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), 9 the diversity jurisdictional
grant.
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania raised sua sponte 10 the concept of limited jurisdiction 1l
of the federal courts and dismissed the action for lack of diversity
jurisdiction.' 2 Relying upon what he deemed to be the law for determining diversity of citizenship of limited partnerships and other
5 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880, 885 (W.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
6 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880, 882 (W.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977); Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1260 (3d Cir. 1977); Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 24.
7 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880, 881 (W.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977); Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1255 (3d Cir. 1977); Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), which provides that "a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of
any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business," the corporate general partner of Carlsberg was considered a citizen of Californiathe state of its incorporation and principal place of business-for purposes of diversity, 413 F.
Supp. at 881.
8 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880, 881 n.1
(W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977). The district court assumed that Cambria
Savings and Loan Association was a "Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania." Id.; Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 3. On appeal, the Third Circuit
did not question this assumption. See Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1255 (3d Cir. 1977).
9 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1255, 1262 (3d
Cir. 1977); Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 10. Section 1332(a) provides, in pertinent part,
that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between
...citizens of different States ....."28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) r1976). Section 1332(c) provides for
the characterization of corporations as citizens. For the text of section 1332(c), see note 7 supra.
50 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F.Supp. 880, 881 (W.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
n See Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F.Supp. 880, 881
(W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977). "[A] cause is presumed to be without [the
court's] jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears." Thomas v. Trustees of the Ohio
State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 210 (1904); see Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irrigation
Co., 211 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1908); Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 337
(1895); McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969); Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 338, 340 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864
(1958).
12 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880, 883, 886
(W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977); Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 2.
The court stated that if Carlsberg's appeal as to the jurisdictional question should result in a

306

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:304

unincorporated associations, 13 District Judge Marsh examined the
citizenship of' all the members of the association in question.' 4 The
district court determined that "all the members" of the limited
partnership included both general and limited partners. 15 Since
thirty-eight of Carlsberg's 1500 limited partners possessed the same
citizenship as that of the defendant association, 16 diversity was lacking
17
and the court denied access to the federal forum.
Relying on principles of federalism 18 and judicial economy,' 9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Carlsberg
Resources Corp. v. Cambria Savings & Loan Association,2 ° affirmed
the decision of the district court. 21 Reiterating the district court's
aggregate theory, 22 the majority, represented by Judge Adams, rereversal of its holding, the suit should be dismissed on the merits since "there is no genuine
issue of material fact ... and defendant Cambria would be entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." 413 F. Supp. at 884.
13 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F.Supp. 880, 881 (W.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
14 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. supp. 880, 881 (W.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977). This method of examination has been characterized in later cases as aggregate treatment. For a further explanation of this treatment, see text
accompanying note 39 infra.
15 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880, 882, 884
(W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
16 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880, 882 (W.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
17 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 880, 883, 886
(W.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
18 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1257 (3d Cir.
1977). The Carlsberg court felt that diversity jurisdiction violated the concept of federalism in
that it "interferes with the autonomy of state tribunals by diverting [state] litigation ... to
federal forums." Id.; see, e.g., Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1941);
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
Federalism embraces neither a "'blind deference to "States' Rights""' nor a "'centralization of
control . . .in our National Government and its courts."' Instead, federalism is " 'the belief that
the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.' " Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86
YALE L.J. 1019, 1019 n.1 (1977) (quoting Justice Black, writing for the majority, in Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971)).
19 Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Say. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1256-57 (3d
Cir. 1977). Judge Adams feared that the "[rielaxation of diversity requirements, intentional or
otherwise, inevitably [would] increase access to the federal courts by litigants now confined to
state courts, thereby augmenting the volume of business of the federal tribunals." Id. at 1256;
see, e.g., Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941); McSparran v. Weist, 402
F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
20 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
21 Id. at 1262.
22 Id. at 1258. Specifically, the court stated that in the case of unincorporated associations,
including partnerships, "the courts should look to the citizenship of the persons comprising such
organizations in . . . determin[ing] whether ... [the association has] compl[ied] with the diver-

sity standard." Id. Essentially, the court viewed "an unincorporated association ... as a citizen
of each state in which it ha[d] a member." Id.
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jected Carlsberg's contentions. Carlsberg had argued for the exclusion
of limited partnerships from the "traditional" rule, therefore, requesting the court to examine the citizenship of only those persons who
24
had capacity to sue 2 3 -in this case, the general partner.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hunter advocated the applicability of the capacity to sue theory posited by Carlsberg. 25 Since limited partners do not possess the capacity to sue or be sued, 26 he
considered it unfair to examine the citizenship of such partners 2for
7
diversity purposes when they are not proper parties to the action.
In determining whether diversity of citizenship exists, federal
courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, 2 8 entertain a presumption
against jurisdiction. 29 The courts guide themselves by constitutional 30 and congressional strictures, 3 ' as well as judicially imposed
23 Id. at 1260-62; 413 F. Supp. at 882; Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 24.
24 554 F.2d at 1260; see 59 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 545 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).

For text of this section, see note 3 supra. See also 59 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 523 (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). Section 523 defines the "[flights, powers, and liabilities of a general
partner." Id. It provides that "[a] general partner shall have all the rights and powers, and be
subject to all the restrictions and liabilities, of a partner in a partnership without limited
partners ..
" Id.
25 554 F.2d at 1262-66.
26 Id. at 1265; see 59 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 545 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
27 554 F.2d at 1265.

28 E.g., Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293, 302 (1908);
Thomas v. Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 210 (1904); LehighMining & Mfg.
Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 337 (1895); Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 382, 383 (1798).
29 E.g., Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293, 302 (1908);
Thomas v. Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 210 (1904); Lehigh Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 337 (1895). "[W]hen 'the inquiry involves the jurisdiction of a
Federal court-the presumption in every state of a cause . . . [is] that it is without the jurisdiction of a court of the United States, unless the contrary appears from the record." 160 U.S. at
337; FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (1976), codified in 28 U.S.C., App.
10 At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the belief "[t]hat there should be a national
judiciary was readily accepted by all." M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 79 (1913). Yet, "the Convention's unhesitant agreement upon such a

power cloaked lively disagreements about .
courts] should have." P. BATOR,

.

. the exact scope of the jurisdiction they [federal

P. MISHKIN,

D. SHAPIRO & H.

WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

WECHSLER,

HART &

6 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter

cited as HART & WECHSLER].

Although diversity jurisdiction was eventually accepted at the Convention, some antiFederalists believed that it "deprived the state courts of jurisdiction in all cases falling within
the sphere allotted to the federal judiciary" and that the federal judicial system prevented state
judicial power from equalling its legislative power. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction. 41 HARV. L. REv. 483, 488 (1928). Alexander Hamilton answered both contentions
by reminding the anti-Federalists that state courts held jurisdiction concurrently with the federal courts in all diversity cases. Id. The resulting constitutional provisions defining the areas of
federal court jurisdiction are contained in article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, which provides that "the judicial Power shall extend to ...

citizens of different States ....

" U.S. CONST. art. 11I, § 2.

controversies . . . between
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limitations. 32 In every case, a federal court may raise the issue of
jurisdiction sua sponte, 3 3 and thereby initially subject the parties to
34
the judicially imposed jurisdictional hurdle of perfect diversity.

It has since been established that these jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution are not
self-executing. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850). Therefore, to have effect,
congressional jurisdictional grants must implement them. Id. at 449.
31 Congress does not have the power to expand or contract the grant of original jurisdiction
given to the Supreme Court by the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
174-75 (1803). However, the proposition that the Constitution mandates that Congress grant the
full scope of judicial power to lower federal courts and the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was rejected by the Supreme Court in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
590, 630-33 (1875). See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945). Therefore, Congress
possesses the ultimate power to adjust the jurisdiction of both the lower federal courts and the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, subject only to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-15 (1868); Battaglia v. General Motors
Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).
32 One all-encompassing judicially imposed stricture is the concept of limited jurisdiction.
This concept first arose in the 1798 Supreme Court decision of Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 382, 383-84 (1798). Friendly, supra note 30, at 505. The Bingham Court held that "it was
necessary to set forth the citizenship . . . of the respective parties, in order to bring the case
within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court." 3 U.S. at 383--84. Later cases wherein the Court
strictly interpreted its jurisdiction include: Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69-71
(1941) (Court realigned parties according to interest in suit, thereby destroying diversity); Miller
& Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irriation Co., 211 U.S. 293, 302-03, 306 (1908) (Court held
that manufactured diversity, in guise of corporate dissolution in one state and reformation in
another state, violated concept of limited jurisdiction and did not operate to vest federal court
with jurisdiction); Thomas v. Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 210 (1904) (Court
found lack of diversity because defendant was not a corporation and did not sufficiently aver
citizenship of members in order to overcome Court's limited jurisdiction); Lehigh Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 337-39 (1895) (manufactured diversity violated concept of
limited jurisdiction). Another important judicial means of limiting federal jurisdiction exists in
the form of the perfect diversity rule. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68
(1806). For a further discussion of the Strawbridge perfect diversity rule, see note 34 infra.
The federal courts have also provided disincentives to litigants in bringing their actions in a
federal forum. E.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) (Court annihilated federal general common law and required federal courts to apply state law, including state decisional law, in federal diversity cases).
33 Thomas v. Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 211 (1904); Underwood v.
Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 340 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1950).
34 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806). Confronted with a fact
situation wherein all the plaintiffs were citizens of Massachusetts and the defendants were citizens of Massachusetts and Vermont, the Strawbridge Court assumed the stance "that the presence of Massachusetts people on both sides of a case [would] neutralize any possibility of bias
affecting litigants from . . . [the state of Vermont]." Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18 (1968). On that basis, the Strawbridge Court
dismissed the case, relegating it to disposition in state court. 7 U.S. at 267.
Some dispute exists as to whether the Constitution mandated the Strawbridge decision.
Currie, supra at 19 n.100. The case of State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523
(1967), answered this question in the negative when it held that the Strawbridge perfect diversity rule was the product of statutory interpretation of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789. 386
U.S. at 530-31. Rejecting the existence of even a statutory mandate, one author relegated the
Strawbridge decision to one merely based on policy. Friendly, supra note 30, at 509. Other
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The rule of perfect diversity demands that all plaintiffs be citizens of different states from all defendants. 3 5 Historically, this rule
operated to exclude unincorporated, 36 as well as incorporated, 3 7 associations from federal court.
Where a court applies entity treatment to an association, the association fulfills the perfect diversity requirement so long as the citizenship of the association differs from the citizenship of the opposing
parties. 38 In contrast, a court's application of aggregate treatment

commentators have argued for the abrogation of the perfect diversity rule on the theory that the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which the rule purported to construe, has since been amended. Id. at 509
n.126. Furthermore, one commentator has indicated that "Strawbridge has been uncritically
extended beyond [its type of fact pattern to] .. . situations in which its rationale seems somewhat less compelling." Currie, supra at 18. For a detailed analysis of the fact patterns to which
Strawbridge has been "uncritically extended," see id. at 18-19. Thus, in the area of corporate
diversity, the Strawbridge rule forced the creation of "entity treatment." See Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction:Past, Present and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Diversity Jurisdiction]. Due to the dual application of the Strawbridge rationale and
aggregate treatment, corporations which had grown to national proportions "could rarely gain
the protection of a federal court." Green, Corporations as Persons, Citizens, and Possessors of
Liberty, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 214 (1946). To remedy this situation, instead of applying the
traditional aggregate treatment of examining the citizenship of corporate members, the courts
created the entity fiction, deeming corporations to be citizens of their state of incorporation. See
text accompanying notes 58-67 infra.
The Strawbridge perfect diversity rule still controls as a construction of the diversity statute
and is subject to change by Congress. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL

COURTS § 24, at 95-96 (3d ed. 1976). Congress has not changed the perfect diversity rule,
however, it has created at least one exception to it, i.e., interpleader. Id. at 95.
'5 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806); C. WRIGHT, supra note 34, at
95; see Currie, supra note 34, at 18.
36 United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 146, 152 (1965) (labor union);
Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 454-56, 457 (1900) (limited partnership
association); Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889) (joint stock company); Baer v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 503 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1974) (interinsurance exchange); Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 338 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958) (labor union);
Jim Walter Investors v. Empire-Madison Inc., 401 F. Supp. 425, 428, 429 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (real
estate investment trust); Stein v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 18 F. Supp. 99, 100-01 (M.D.
Tenn. 1960) (labor union); International Allied Printing Trades Ass'n v. Master Printers Union,
34 F. Supp. 178, 181 (D.N.J. 1940) (labor union).
37 The perfect diversity rule operated to exclude incorporated associations from those federal
courts which followed the Deveaux rationale. McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction: Corporations In The Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction Of The Federal Courts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 853,
872 (1943). See, e.g., Commercial & R.R. Bank of Vicksburg v. Slocomb, Richards & Co., 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 60, 64 (1840); Bank of the United States v. Martin, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 479, 479-80
(1831); Breithaupt v. Bank of Ga., 26 U.S.(1 Pet.) 238, 238-39 (1828); Sullivan v. Fulton Steam
Boat Co., 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 450, 451-52 (1821). For a full discussion of the Deveaux rationale
and its role in the growth of the aggregate and entity treatments of corporations under the
perfect diversity rule, see notes 48-56 infra and accompanying text.
38 Originally, corporations were presumed to be citizens solely of their state of incorporation. Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853); Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844). In 1958, however, the
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requires that it look to the citizenship of all the members of the association in determining the existence of diversity. Aggregate treatment thus effectively bars many associations from federal court because perfect diversity is destroyed if one member of the association
39
bears the same citizenship as that of the opposing party.
In an attempt to achieve entity treatment and thereby negate the
impact of the perfect diversity rule, proponents of the availability of
federal court jurisdiction to associations have formulated three distinct
theories-the "label" theory, 40 the "characteristics" theory, 4 and the
42
"capacity to sue" theory.
The label theory would result in entity treatment only for incorporated associations and would relegate all other associations to
aggregate treatment. 43 The characteristics theory, in contrast to the
amendment of the diversity statute made corporations citizens of both their state of incorporation and their principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976).
3' For a listing of cases where associations have been barred from federal courts due to
aggregate treatment, see note 40 infra.
40 The main thrust of the label theory is that an association must possess a corporate "birth
certificate" in order to receive entity treatment. E.g., United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny,
Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 149-52 (1965); Thomas v. Trustee of the Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207,
217 (1904); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 454 (1900); Chapman v.
Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889); Baer v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 503 F.2d 393, 395 (2d
Cir. 1974); Arbuthnot v. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 264 F.2d 260, 261 (10th Cir. 1959); Swan v.
First Church of Christ Scientist, 225 F.2d 745, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1955); Fred Macey Co. v.
Macey, 135 F. 725, 727-28 (6th Cir. 1905); Jim Walter Investors v. Empire-Madison Inc., 401
F. Supp. 425, 428 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Larwin Mortgage Investors v. Riverdrive Mall, Inc., 392 F.
Supp. 97, 99 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Feldmann Ins. Agency v. Brodsky, 195 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D.
Md. 1961); Stein v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 183 F. Supp. 99, 101 (M.D. Tenn. 1960).
41 Cases employing the characteristics theory do not require that the association be a corporation, but that it merely be similar to a corporation. E.g., Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288
U.S. 476, 481-82 (1933); Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 327-28
(1853); Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston BR. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844);
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 88-92 (1809); Mason v. American
Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 393, 397, 399-400 (2d Cir. 1964); cf. Brocki v. American Express
Co., 279 F.2d 785, 788 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871 (1960) (where court denied entity
treatment to association because it lacked corporate status, while approving Russell characteristics test).
42 Cases utilizing the capacity to sue theory focus on the citizenship of only those members
of an unincorporated association who possess capacity to sue under state law. E.g., Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817
(1966); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd on
other grounds, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972); see Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d
355, 372 (3d Cir. 1948); C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships,
375 F. Supp. 446, 449 (M.D.N.C. 1974). But see Feldmann Ins. Agency v. Brodsky, 195 F.
Supp. 483, 485 (D.Md. 1961); International Allied Printing Traders Ass'n v. Master Printers
Union, 34 F. Supp. 178, 181 (D.N.J. 1940).
43 Compare Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston BR. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 554,
558 (1844) (incorporated association viewed as entity) and Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 57
U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853) (incorporated association treated as entity) with Chapman v.
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label theory, would broaden the types of associations that could receive entity treatment. 44 Rather than applying the mechanical determinative of whether an association is incorporated, this theory determines, on a case-by-case basis, whether an association possesses
characteristics sufficiently similar to a corporation so as to warrant
entity treatment. 45 The capacity to sue theory, a hybrid approach,
would mandate aggregate treatment of the association, but would
limit the members relevant to the question of diversity to those who
have capacity to sue under state law. 46 Furthermore, policy consida sigerations of federalism and judicial economy have also played
47
employ.
will
courts
the
theory
which
to
as
nificant role
The characteristics theory first arose in application to corporations. 4 8 The courts, in their treatment of corporations, gradually developed the theory to allow corporations access to federal courts as
entities, i.e., citizens of' their place of' incorporation. 4 9 In Bank of

Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889) (joint stock association dealt with as aggregate) and United
Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 149-53 (1965) (unincorporated labor union
relegated to aggregate treatment).
4' The characteristics theory would broaden the type of associations that could acquire access to federal courts by granting entity treatment, not only to those associations that have
incorporated, but also to those unincorporated associations which possess characteristics similar
to a corporation, i.e., limited partnerships, joint stock companies and unincorporated labor
unions.
4- Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1933); Mason v. American Express
Co., 334 F.2d 392, 397-400 (2d Cir. 1964). For a detailed discussion of the Russell and
Mason decisions, see notes 83-92, 102-08 infra and accompanying text.
4' Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 78, 183-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 817 (1966); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff'd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972). In the foregoing cases, the capacity to sue
theory mandated that the general partners of the limited partnership would be the members
relevant to the question of diversity jurisdiction. Colonial Realty, 358 F.2d at 183-84; Erving,
349 F. Supp. at 711. For a variation on the capacity to sue approach, see ALl, STUDY OF THE
DiVISION OF JURI SDicTiON BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1301(b)(2), at 10, 114-17

[hereinater cited as ALl STUDY], discussed in note 118 infra.
47 The courts have always strictly construed their diversity jurisdictional power in order to
comport with their federalist mandate "of avoiding offense to state sensitiveness," and with their
judicial economy policy "of relieving the federal courts of the overwhelming burden of "business
that intrinsically belongs to the state courts;' in order to keep them free for their distinctive
federal business." Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941).
48 Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 327-28 (1953); Louisville,

Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844); Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 85-92 (1809). The characteristics theory as applied to
corporations consisted of determining whether a corporation possessed characteristics sufficiently
similar to those of a natural person to warrant entity treatment. Marshall, 57 U.S. at 327-28;
Letson, 43 U.S. at 558; Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 85-92.

49 Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328-29 (1853); Louisville,
Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844).
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the United States v. Deveaux, 50 the first case dealing with the diversity status of corporations, 5 ' the Supreme Court recognized the
characteristics theory, but refused to employ it for the purpose of
determining federal jurisdiction. 5 2 Although the Court agreed that
53
corporations possessed many of the attributes of natural persons,
5 4 it
and should, therefore, be treated as entities for limited purposes,
questioned whether a corporation was a citizen within the constitutional diversity grant. 55 Consequently, the Court, in determining
jurisdiction, examined the citizenship of all the members of the cor56
poration.
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad v. Letson,5 7

changed the precedent established in the Deveaux case by relying
upon the characteristics theory to determine the existence of diver-

50 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).

51 See Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1426, 1427 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction]. Cases prior to Deveaux failed to raise questions as to corporate
diversity and, instead, assumed that corporations were citizens for federal jurisdictional purposes. Id.
52 9 U.S. at 88-92.

53 Id. at 85, 88-89. The Deveaux decision enumerated the similarities between corporations
and natural persons: "capacity to make contracts and to acquire property, [capacity] . . . 'to sue
and be sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be answered, defend and be defended, in
courts of record, or any other place whatsoever.' " Id. at 85.
54 Id. at 88-89. The Deveaux Court recognized that the characteristics theory called for
entity treatment of a corporation in certain instances-suits involving the levying of taxes, and
the levying of the poor rates. Id.
55 Id. at 86-87; Green, supra note 34, at 216; McGovney, supra note 37, at 866.
Since the United States Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 failed to address the issue
of whether corporations could be considered citizens for diversity purposes, corporate diversity
status remained an open question until the Deveaux decision. Comment, CorporateDiversity of
Citizenship Under 28 U.S.C. §1332(c), 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 211, 211 (1974); see Green, supra at
211.
56 9 U.S. at 91-92. Under Deveaux's application of aggregate treatment, if one shareholder
of the corporation was a citizen of the same state as that of the opposing party, complete
diversity would not exist and the perfect diversity rule would bar the suit from federal court.
Comment, supra note 55, at 211. This result, however, did not occur in the Deveaux case even
under the purported application of aggregate treatment because the Court did not look behind
the averment in the complaint to determine the actual citizenship of the parties. Instead, it
relied on the statement that all members possessed citizenship diverse from that of the opposing
party. 9 U.S. at 92; Green, supra note 34, at 211-12; Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction, supra
note 51, at 1427 n.9. The Deveaux Court rationalized its decision by stating that "[b]eing authorized to sue in their corporate name, [the plaintiffs] could make the averment [of citizenship], and it must apply to the plaintiffs as individuals, because [the averment] could not be
true as applied to the corporation." 9 U.S. at 92.
57 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
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sity. 58 In Letson, a New York citizen sued the railroad in federal
court for nonperformance of a contract requiring the railroad to construct a road. 59 The railroad challenged the existence of diversity
jurisdiction, alleging that six of' its members were citizens of' New
York-the same citizenship as that of Letson. 60 In repudiating the
aggregate treatment of' corporations developed by Deveaux, the
Letson Court stated that since the characteristics of the corporation
vested it with powers similar to those of a natural person, 6 ' the corporation should receive entity treatment for diversity purposes. 6 2
Granting corporations entity treatment, Letson deemed the corporation to be a citizen of its state of' incorporation, 63 and therefore diverse from the New York appellee.
In Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,64 the Court essentially followed, the characteristics approach of Letson. 65 Rather than
treating the corporation as a citizen of the state of its incorporation,6 6
the Marshall Court held that the members would be "justly presumed to be resident[s] in the State which is the necessary habitat of

58 Id. at 554-55; Comment, supra note 55, at 211. The Letson Court voiced its disenchantment with the Deveaux reasoning. 43 U.S. at 555. The interrelationship of Deveaux and the
perfect diversity rule forced the Letson Court to reach its decision. Id. at 554-55; McGovney,
supra note 37, at 879.
59 43 U.S. at 497.
60 Id. at 497-98. It is interesting to note that the six non-diverse parties were stockholders
of corporations which were members of the Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad. Id.
The Letson Court recognized the unfairness in this fact situation, when it overruled Deveaux
and employed the characteristics theory. McGovney, supra note 37, at 879. The Letson Court
examined such corporate/natural person similarities as capacity to contract, to commit torts, to
sue and be sued, to hold property, to manage its own affairs, and the ability to do business in a
particular state. 43 U.S. at 557-58; Currie, supra note 34, at 34. Another underlying reason for
the Letson decision was the danger of bias: "a corporation can be the victim or the beneficiary
of prejudice against foreigners just as if it were a human being." Currie, supra at 34.
61 43 U.S. at 558.
62 Id. at 557-58.
63 Id. at 558-59; CorporateDiversity Jurisdiction, supra note 51, at 1428. The Letson decision, in effect, constituted a repudiation of Strawbridge in that the Letson Court felt that "[t]he
presence of a shareholder from the same state as the opposing party was not enough to remove
the danger of bias." Currie, supra note 34, at 34-35.
64 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
65 Id. at 328. The Court stated that because stockholders have the capacity to contract, sue
and be sued in their corporate name, plaintiffs who dealt with these stockholders as a corporation should not be barred from bringing their action in federal court because of the application
of aggregate treatment. Id. at 327-28. Since the corporation possessed the characteristics of a
natural person, although in a representative capacity, plaintiffs who dealt with it as an entity
should be able to sue it in federal court as such. Id.
66 Some cases subsequent to the Marshall decision ignored the Marshall manipulation of
terms and employed the Letson formula. McGovney, supra note 37, at 893.
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the corporation, and where alone they can be made subject to
suit." 67 The Marshall rationale prevailed until Congress,. in a 1958
amendment to section 1332 of the diversity statute, 68 mandated judicial recognition of a corporation as a citizen of both the state of' its
incorporation and the state of its principal place of business. 6 9 In
addition to codifying the Supreme Court's policy of permitting corporations access to federal court, 70 this statutory scheme operated to
eliminate some of the anomalies inherent in basing corporate diver71
sity jurisdiction solely upon the state of incorporation.
The label theory, initially appearing in application to unincorporated associations, 7 2 operated to bar these associations from federal
court. Relying upon this theory, the Supreme Court, in the 1889 decision of Chapman v. Barney, 7 concluded that a joint stock company
could not be a citizen of the state of New York for diversity purposes. 74 The Court failed to examine the characteristics of the stock
17 57 U.S. at 328. The Marshall holding had the same effect as the Letson decision. Its main
contribution to the diversity status of corporations was the avoidance of the constitutional question of whether a corporation could be deemed a "citizen." McGovney, supra note 37, at 886;
Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 51, at 1428. To reach its result, the Marshall
Court followed a four-step analysis. As a threshold issue, the Court determined that a corporation " '[could] not be a citizen,' " McGovney, supra at 886, and that the Deveaux case controlled even though Letson overruled it. Id. Therefore, the determinative of the existence of
diversity jurisdiction should have followed the Deveaux rationale that "a suit by or against a
corporation may be regarded as a suit by or against its shareholders, and if their citizenship is
appropriate, jurisdiction exists." Id. However, "to make [the shareholders'] citizenship appropriate [to the sanctioning of diversity jurisdiction, the court] cut off inquiry and deem[ed] all the
shareholders of every state corporation to be citizens of the state that incorporate[d] it." Id.
68 Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 51, at 1428.
69 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976). For the text of the amendment to the diversity statute, see
note 7 supra.
70 S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3099, 3119 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1830]; H.R. REP. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-4 (1958) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1706]. "The amended provision embodies
the same policy that originally motivated judicial employment of a fiction to justity treatment ot
a corporation as a citizen ....
Comment, Unincorporated Associations: Diversity Jurisdiction
and the ALl Proposal, 1965 DUKE L.J. 329, 336.
71 S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 70, at 3119-20; H.R. REP. No. 1706, supra note 70, at 4;
Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 51, at 1430-32; 65 COLUM. L. REV. 162, 166--67
(1965); 78 HARv. L. REv. 1661, 1663 (1965).
72 Prior to the creation of the label theory, at least one form of unincorporated association,
the joint stock company, received entity treatment under the Marshall rationale. 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 162, 163 (1965).
73 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
74 Id. at 682. The Chapman Court employed the label theory to
den[y] unincorporated associations citizenship independent of that of their members
for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. Consequently, even if an association
could sue and be sued as an entity under state law, diversity jurisdiction was defeated where any member was a citizen of the same state as an adverse party.
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company in determining whether it qualified under the Marshall
rationale. 75 Rather, the Court reasoned that since state law did not
label the joint stock company a corporation, it did not qualify for
76
entity treatment.
Similarly, in the 1900 case of Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel
Co. v. Jones, 7 7 the Supreme Court applied the Chapman reasoning to
a limited partnership association. 78 Writing for the majority, Mr.
Justice Harlan held that the limited partnership association was not a
corporation under the law of its state of organization, 79 and that its
capacity to sue in its association name did not serve to qualify the
association as a corporation.8 " Consequently, the Court relegated the
limited partnership association to aggregate treatment. 81
In many of the circuits, the label theory became a popular short
form determinative of the diversity status of' unincorporated associations. 8 2 However, in a 1933 case, Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,83

Comment, Citizenship of Unincorporated Associations for Diversity Purposes, 50 VA. L. REV.
1135, 1135 (1964).
75 129 U.S. at 682. The Court examined only one characteristic of the joint stock
company-its capacity to sue. The Court found that
although [the joint stock company] may be authorized by the laws of the State of New
York to bring suit in the name of its president, that fact cannot give the company
power, by that name, to sue in a Federal court.
Id.
76 Id. The Chapman Court, focusing
on the failure of the association in question
to incorporate, stated:
the express company cannot be a citizen of New York, within the meaning of the
statutes regulating jurisdiction, unless it be a corporation. The allegation that the
company was organized under the laws of New York is not an allegation that it is a
corporation. In fact, the allegation is, that the company is not a corporation, but a
joint-stock company ....
Id.
77 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
78 Id. at 454-57. The limited partnership association differs from the limited partnership in
that all the members of the association have equal status, none bearing personal liability. A.
BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG'S LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS § 26A, at 151 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as CRANE & BROMBERG]. In the limited partnership, however, the general partners are
personally liable, while the limited partners are not. Id. § 26, at 146-47.
79 177 U.S. at 454.
80 Id. at 455-56. Citing Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, the Supreme
Court stated that the Letson holding "has been so long recognized and applied that it is not now
to be questioned. No such rule however has been applied to partnership associations although
such8 1 associations may have some of the characteristics of a corporation." Id. at 456.
Id.
82 The courts that employed the label theory in this manner limited their analysis of the
diversity question to the determination of whether the particular association was a corporation.
E.g., Thomas v. Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 215 (1904) (sixth circuit); Great
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the Supreme Court extended the characteristics theory 84 by applying
it to the limited partnership-a unique form of' unincorporated association. 8 5 Upon examining the association's characteristics as defined under Puerto Rico law, 86 the Russell Court decided to treat the
sociedad en comandita as an entity 87 "for purposes of federal jurisdiction." 8 8 The focus of Russell created confusion among the federal
circuits. 8 9 The controversy concerned: first, whether courts should
accept Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. as precedent in the common law,
as well as the civil law, diversity area; 90 second, whether the courts

S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 455 (1900) (sixth circuit); Levering & Garrigues
Co. v. Morrin, 61 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1932), aff'd, 289 U.S. 103 (1933); Taylor v. Weir, 171
F. 636, 639 (3d Cir. 1909); Rountree v. Adams Express Co., 165 F. 152, 154 (8th Cir. 1908);
Fred Macey Co. v. Macey, 135 F. 725, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1905).
83 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
84 Id. at 481; 65 COLum. L. REV. 162, 163 (1965). Russell "'[flollowe[dI the 'careful analysis'
of Marshall rather than the reliance on 'labels' [which] characterize[d] Chapman .... ..Comment, supra note 74, at 1135-36.
85 288 U.S at 481. The major distinction between limited partnerships and other unincorporated associations, such as general partnerships and joint stock associations, exists in the limited
liability of the limited partners as opposed to the general liability of the members of other
unincorporated associations. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 78, § 34, at 179.
86 288 U.S. at 481-82. These characteristics include the power to contract, own property
and transact business, and sue and be sued in its own name and right. Furthermore,
[i]ts members are not thought to have a sufficient personal interest in a suit brought
against the entity to entitle them to intervene as parties defendant . . . . It is
created by articles of association filed as public records .. . . Where the articles so
provide, the sociedad endures for a period prescribed by them regardless of the
death or withdrawal of individual members .. . . Powers of management may be
vested in managers designated by the articles from among the members whose participation is unlimited, and they alone may perform acts legally binding on the
sociedad ....
Its members are not primarily liable for its acts and debts .... and
its creditors are preferred with respect to its assets and property over the creditors
of individual members, although the latter may reach the interests of the individual
members in the common capital .... Although the members whose participation is
unlimited are made contingently liable for the debts of the sociedad in the event
that its assets are insufficient to satisfy them .. ., this liability is of no more consequence for present purposes than that imposed on corporate stockholders by the
statutes of some states.
Id. (citations omitted).
87 288 U.S. at 481-82. "'[Tlhe Court held in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. that a sociedad en
comandita, an unincorporated creature of the civil law, should, because of its similarity to a
corporation, be treated as one for jurisdictional purposes." Comment, supra note 74, at 1136.
88 288 U.S. at 482. The Russell case has been criticized as involving "only a close analogue
Comment, supra note 74, at 1136; see notes 179, 186-88 infra
of diversity jurisdiction.
and accompanying text.
89 See notes 90-95 infra and accompanying text.
90 Both Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1964), and R.H.
Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 336 F.2d 160, 162-63 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 382 U.S.
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should employ the Russell approach only in the narrower field of limited partnerships; 91 and, third, whether the federal courts should
apply the label or characteristics theory to all unincorporated associa92
tions.
Illustrative of this confusion were the 1964 circuit court decisions
of Mason v. American Express Co., 93 and R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v.
United Steelworkers.94 The Mason and Bouligny courts differed in their
evaluation of the governing law.95 In an attempt to limit the Russell
decision, 96 the Fourth Circuit in the Bouligny case stated that "the
145 (1965), addressed this issue. Bouligny limited the Russell decision to the interpretation of a
civil law statute, 336 F.2d at 162-63, while Mason argued for its extension to both the common
law and civil law, 334 F.2d at 398-99.
91 See Swan v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 225 F.2d 745, 747 (9th Cir. 1955); Stein v.
American Fed'n of Musicians, 183 F. Supp. 99, 99-100 (M.D. Tenn. 1960).
92 R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 336 F.2d 160, 161-64 (4th Cir. 1964)
(applying label theory to unincorporated labor union); Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392,
393 (2d Cir. 1964) (applying characteristics theory to joint stock association). Before the advent
of the Russell application of characteristics theory to the limited partnership, the courts had
consistently employed label theory in determining the diversity jurisdictional status of unincorporated associations. E.g., Thomas v. Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 215-17
(1940) (Board of Trustees); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 454 (1900)
(limited partnership association); Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889) (joint stock
company); Taylor v. Weir, 171 F. 636, 639 (3d Cir. 1909) (joint stock association); Rountree v.
Adams Express Co., 165 F. 152, 154 (8th Cir. 1908) (joint stock company); Fred Macey Co. v.
Macey, 135 F. 727, 727-28 (6th Cir. 1905) (limited partnership association). However, the
characteristics theory had appeared prior to 1933, but in application to corporations. Marshall v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 327-28 (1853); Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844); Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 88-92 (1809). Subsequent to Russell, label theory still survived where
courts dealt with associations such as an unincorporated labor union, United Steelworkers v.
R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 152 (1965); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F.2d
115, 117 (2d Cir. 1932); Stein v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 183 F. Supp. 99, 100-01 (M.D.
Tenn. 1960); inter-insurance exchange, Baer v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 503 F.2d 393, 395-96
(2d Cir. 1974); Arbuthnot v. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 264 F.2d 260, 261 (10th Cir. 1959); insurance company, Feldmann Ins. Agency v. Brodsky, 195 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D. Md. 1961); unincorporated religious society, Swan v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 225 F.2d 745, 747 (9th
Cir. 1955); real estate investment trust, Jim walter Investors v. Empire-Madison, Inc., 401 F.
Supp. 425, 428 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Larwin Mortgage Investors v. Riverdrive Mall, Inc., 392 F.
Supp. 97, 99 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
93 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964).
94 336 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
95 Comment, supra note 70, at 332-33. "The divergent results in Mason and Bouligny are
attributable, inter alia, to differing interpretations of the Supreme Court's decisions in Chapman v. Barney and Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co." Id. at 333 (footnote omitted).
9r 336 F.2d at 162-63. The Bouligny court also distinguished two other cases that might be
construed to support an extension of corporate entity treatment to unincorporated
associations-United Mineworkers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922), and American
Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954). 336
F.2d at 162-63. The Coronado Court's characterization of unions with the capacity to sue and be
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question before the [Russell] Court was simply one of the interpretation of the [Puerto Rico] statute 97 -not a question of constitutional
diversity jurisdiction." 9 8 Relying upon the label theory as posited in
Chapman" and, in the alternative, the 1958 amendment to the diversity statute, 10 0 the Bouligny court held that a labor union could
not qualify for entity treatment. 0 '
Contrary to the Bouligny approach, the Second Circuit in the
Mason case distinguished the Chapman decision 102 and opted for the

sued as entities was disposed of by the Bouligny court on the basis that Coronado involved a
federal question and did not intend to address the union's status for diversity purposes. Id. at
162. Bouligny found American Fed'n of Musicians v. Stein inapplicable to the diversity issue
since Stein only dealt with a grant of a temporary injunction while the question of diversity
jurisdiction was pending. The ultimate resolution of this jurisdictional issue resulted in a denial
of entity treatment to the labor union. Id. at 163; Stein v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 183 F.
Supp. 99, 101-02 (M.D. Tenn. 1960).
97 336 F.2d at 163.- The Bouligny court felt that the Russell case was construing only the
Organic Act of Puerto Rico:
Although in view of the character of the plaintiff, the suit could on no theory be
entertained as a diversity suit by an Article III court, the Supreme Court [Russell]
said that "admittedly, if the individual members of the Sociedad are 'parties' within
the meaning of the Organic Act . . . the suit is one within the jurisdiction of the
District Court because of their non-residence, diversity of citizenship being unnecessary.
Id. (quoting Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 478 (1933) (emphasis in original)).
98 Id. at 163. The Bouligny court stated:
Clearly the case does not by any stretch of the imagination hold that the Sociedad
was a citizen of Puerto Rico for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under Article III.
Nor can the Court's analogy between the civil law Sociedad and the common law
corporation justify a contention that it was consciously expanding federal diversity
jurisdiction.
Id.
99 Id. at 161-62. Adopting the aggregate result of Chapman, the Bouligny court reiterated
that "for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the actual citizenship of each of the members of an
unincorporated association . . . is controlling." Id. at 161. Therefore, the unincorporated labor
union was barred from federal court. Id. at 164.
100 Id. Bouligny held that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976) barred any effect the Russell holding
might have had on the diversity status of an unincorporated labor union because the statute "refer[s] specifically to corporations, providing that they shall be 'deemed' citizens." Id. Furthermore, the statute, with reference to corporations, "now provides dual citizenship: a corporation
is to be treated as a citizen of any state by which it is incorporated, and also of the state in
which it maintains its principal place of business." Id. Finally, the court believed that "unincorThey are incapable of dual citiporated associations cannot be equated with corporations ....
zenship and hence would be treated more favorably than corporations for diversity purposes."
Id.
10 id.
102 334 F.2d at 395-96.
The Second Circuit indicated five major flaws in the Chapman decision: Chapman rendered
its decision without the benefit of briefs or oral arguments on the jurisdictional question; the
label theory was administered as a short form determinative with little analysis of the diversity
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"more flexible test" of Russell in application to unincorporated associations.' 03 This test "demand[ed] that consideration be given to
whether an organization's essential characteristics sufficiently invest[ed] it, like a corporation, with a complete legal personality distinct from that of the members it represents." 104 Mason interpreted
Russell as determining, in accordance with the reasoning of Marshall,'0 5 "whether the essential characteristics of a sociedad under
Puerto Rican law demanded that it, like a corporation, be considered
capable of possessing a separate citizenship." 106 Russell had held in
the affirmative and Mason followed suit. Mason found that, under
New York law, 10 7 the characteristics of this particular joint stock association justified its treatment as a citizen of the state of its creation
for federal diversity purposes. 10 8
The United States Supreme Court attempted to eliminate the
divergent approaches to unincorporated associations 109 created by the
circuit court opinions of Bouligny and Mason by granting certiorari 110
issue and the application of the Marshall rationale to unincorporated associations; the Court
failed to consider Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566 (1870), which
applied the characteristics theory to a joint stock company granting it entity treatment for purposes of the privileges and immunities clause; Chapman neglected to examine all the characteristics that the joint stock association might have possessed which would have warranted entity
treatment, due to its overriding concern that state capacity to sue laws would become a determinative of diversity jurisdiction; Chapman confused the concept of capacity to sue with that of
capacity for citizenship. 334 F.2d at 395-96.
103 Id. at 393, 399-400. The Mason court indicated that the characteristics theory employed
by Russell has also been used by the federal courts in federal question cases, e.g., United States
v. Adams Express Co., 229 U.S. 381 (1913). Id. at 396. See also United Mineworkers v.
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385-91 (1922).
104 334 F.2d at 393.
105 Id. at 397; see Currie, supra note 34, at 35.
106334 F.2d at 397.
107 Id. at 399-400. The Mason court felt that the "New York joint stock association
resemble[d] the sociedad which was subject to review in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co." to a
"remarkable extent.'" Id. at 399. Under New York law, the unincorporated joint stock association possessed characteristics similar to a corporation: "creat[ion] pursuant to written articles of
association which must be filed, like a certificate of incorporation, as a public record," id.;
management "concentrated in the sole hands of the directors," id. at 400; the association's
ability to "purchase, take, hold, and convey real property in the name of its president," id.; its
capacity to sue or be sued in the name of its president, id.; the authorization of the shareholders of the association to sue the association, id.; the shareholders' "personal ... liab[ility] for
the debts of the association." Id. at 400; 65 COLUM. L. REV. 162, 164-65 (1965).
108 334 F.2d at 393; 65 COLUM. L. REV. 162, 165 (1965).
109 United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1965). Although the
issue was once purportedly settled by the Chapman decision, "[i]t is evident that Mason and
Bouligny have reopened directly the question of the citizenship of unincorporated enterprises in
diversity litigation." Comment, supra note 74, at 1136-37.
110379 U.S. 958 (1965).
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in United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc.1 1 1 In Bouligny, the
Court adhered to the Chapman rule, regarding it as a complement to
the congressional intent to limit federal court jurisdicfion. 1 12 Writing
for the majority, Justice Fortas distinguished Russell as a decision
which attempted to "[fit] an exotic creation of the civil law, the
sociedad en comandita, into a federal scheme which knew it not." 113
Despite the allegations of injustice due to local prejudice urged by
the parties in support of federal jurisdiction, 1 14 the Court, giving
great weight to the problem of determining the citizenship of a labor
union with local as well as national organizations, 115 deferred to Con116
gress to change the Chapman rule through legislation.
To vitiate the impact of the label theory on limited partnerships,
and to circumvent what some courts deemed the questionable effect
of Russell on the diversity status of limited partnerships, courts have
entertained the capacity to sue theory. The Second Circuit in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co. 1 7 was the first court to employ
this theory. 118 On the basis of section 115 of the New York Partner382 U.S. 145 (1965).
at 148-49. The Chapman case was decided "in [a] climate," where Congress was
"enact[ing] sharp curbs" on diversity litigation. Id. These sharp curbs included: "quadrupl[ing
the jurisdictional amount, confin[ing] the right of removal to non-resident defendants, reinstitut[ing] protections against jurisdiction by collusive assignment, and narrow[ing] venue." Id.
at 148.
113 Id. at 151.
114 Id. at 150. The petitioner argued that the danger of local prejudice was particularly onerous in the case of labor unions. Instances of prejudice include:
local juries [which] may be tempted to favor local interest at [the union's] expense
• . . [and which] may also be influenced by the fear that unionization would adversely affect the economy of the community and its customs and practices in the
field of race relations.
Id. The petitioner therefore reasoned that the labor union's access to a federal forum with its
concomitant benefits of "judges less exposed to local pressures ... , juries selected from wider
geographical areas, review in appellate courts reflecting a multi-state perspective, and more
effective review by . . . [the Supreme] Court" would greatly mitigate the danger of prejudice.
Id.
115 Id. at 152-53. The labor union possesses no state of incorporation, and in addition has local
and national organizations located across the country. Id.
116 Id. at 153. Although the Court denied its power to recognize the labor union as an entity,
it implicitly favored a congressional enactment to this effect. ld.; 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 793,
796 (1966).
17 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
118 Id. at 183. Under the Colonial Realty rationale, the capacity to sue theory is a unique
approach which requires the application of aggregate treatment to the association, but only
examines the citizenship of those members that possess capacity to sue. Id. at 183-84. Therefore, since the general partners of the limited partnership possessed citizenship diverse from
that of the opposing party, the court sustained federal court jurisdiction. Id.; C.P. Robinson
Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnerships, 375 F. Supp. 446, 449 (M.D.N.C. 1974);
111

112 Id.
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ship Law,' 1 9 which stated that limited partners lacked capacity to
sue, the court only looked to the citizenship of the general partnersl2of
0
the limited partnership in determining the existence of diversity.
The first court to engage in an extended analysis of the diversity
status of the limited partnership was the Court of' Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Savings 1&
22
Loan Ass'n. 12 1 Approaching the issue from a label perspective,
the majority neglected to discuss the characteristics theory of Russell,
judicial economy
and trimmed their argument with federalism and
12 4
result.
aggregate
an
reach
to
123
concepts
policy
Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D.N.Y.) aff'd on other
grounds, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
The capacity to sue concept has been rejected by other courts as a basis of federal court
jurisdiction for unincorporated associations. See Thomas v. Trustees of the Ohio State Univ.,
195 U.S. 207, 217 (1904); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 455 (1900);
Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889); Feldmann Ins. Agency v. Brodsky, 195 F. Supp.
483, 485 (D. Md. 1961). "Although the [joint stock company] may be authorized by the laws of
the State of New York to bring suit in the name of its president, that fact cannot give the
company power, by that name, to sue in Federal court." 129 U.S. at 682.
Capacity to sue is also a dimension of the characteristics theory because it is one of the
characteristics that invests an unincorporated association with qualities sufficiently similar to a
corporation to receive entity treatment. For a listing of cases supportive of this theory, see note
41 supra.
Another interesting variation of the capacity to sue theory is that proposed by the American
Law Institute (ALl). This approach grants entity treatment to those associations which possess
capacity to sue as entities under the law of the state where the action is being heard. ALl
STUDY, supra note 46, § 1301(b) (2), at 10, 114. For diversity purposes the situs of citizenship
for such an association is the association's principal place of business. Id. The purposes of the
ALl proposal include a desire
not to deprive an out-of-state plaintiff suing such an association in the state of its
principal activity from access to the federal court because a member of the association is of the same citizenship as the plaintiff. Also, the association with its principal
place of business in another state suing as a plaintiff will not be barred from a
federal forum simply because one of its members is of the same citizenship as the
defendant.
Id. at 115. This variation had initially appeared in 1948 where the Third Circuit held that an
association's ability under state law to sue in its own name entitled it to entity treatment for
diversity purposes. Van Sant v. American Express Co., 169 F.2d 355, 372 (3d Cir. 1948). However, this decision has been criticized as confusing "capacity for suit . .. [with] capacity for
citizenship for jurisdictional purposes." Mason, 334 F.2d at 396 n.7; Comment, supra note 74,
at 1143 n.65.
119 358 F.2d at 183-84. Section 115 provides that a limited partner "is not a proper party to
proceedings by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce a limited partN.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115 (McKinner's right against or liability to the partnership .
ney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
120 358 F.2d at 183-84.
121 554 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1977).
122 Id. at 1258-59.
123 Id. at 1256-57.
124Id. at 1259; see note 130 infra.
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In affirming the district court's sua sponte treatment of the jurisdictional question,' 2 5 Judge Adams writing for the Carlsberg majority, set the stage for an analysis of' the diversity power by discussing
the concepts of* judicial economy and federalism.' 26 In the court's
opinion, judicial economy and federalism require federal courts "to
adhere meticulously to the constitutional and statutory standards governing diversity jurisdiction."1 2 7 Two factors are manifestly inherent
in this standard. First, "the federal courts should resolve any questions that they may have as to the existence of diversity jurisdiction
before proceeding to a decision on the merits." 128 Second, "federal
tribunals should be demanding in evaluating whether diversity jurisdiction subsists." 129 Applying this standard of meticulous adherence
to the specific issue of' the diversity status of limited partnerships,
coupled with a traditional application of the label theory to unincorporated associations, the majority barred the Carlsberg limited
30
partnership from federal court.'
The majority stated that the label theory constituted the only test
of diversity jurisdiction.' 3 1 The court asserted that "where noncorporate entities-including partnerships-are concerned, the courts
should look to the citizenship of the persons comprising such organizations in order to determine whether there is compliance with the
diversity standard." 132 Relying on Chapman v. Barney as the cornerstone of the label test,13 3 the court cited it for the proposition that

125 554 F. 2d at 1256. The defendants failed to raise the issue of diversity jurisdiction, so the
district court, in keeping with the policy of limited jurisdiction, raised the issue on its own
motion. 413 F.Supp. 880, 881; 554 F.2d at 1255-56. The policy of limited jurisdiction has
repeatedly appeared. See cases cited in notes 28-29 supra.
126 554 F.2d at 1256-57; see notes 18-19 supra.
127 554 F.2d at 1257.
128

Id.

129 Id.

130 Id. at 1258. The perfect diversity rule greatly limits federal diversity jurisdiction when
applied to a large unincorporated association treated as an aggregate by the courts. This result
occurred in the Carlsberg case where the majority applied label theory with its concomitant
aggregate effect. Id. The Carlsberg court meticulously adhered to the concept that "all parties
on one side of . . .[the] litigation must be of a different citizenship from all of those on the
other." Id. With this rule in mind, the court determined that "parties," as related to Carlsberg,
included all 1500 limited partners and the one general partner. Id. at 1259. Yet, the court did
not relate "parties" to Cambria adopting the district court's assumption that Cambria was a
Pennsylvania corporation and therefore should be treated as an entity for diversity purposes. Id.
1254-62; 413 F. Supp. at 881 n.I.
131 554 F.2d at 1258.
132 Id. (footnotes omitted).
133 Id. at 1258-59.
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"varying membership status should not bear on the fundamental inquiry whether diversity exists."134 On the basis that the Chapman
status was coterminous with the varying membership status of the
limited partnership, the majority deemed Chapman persuasive au135
thority.
Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones provided further
support for the court's application of the Chapman rule to limited
partnerships.1 3 6 Despite a recognition that the limited partnership
association of Great Southern differed from the Carlsberg limited
partnership, 137 the court adopted Great Southern's application of the
Chapman analysis to a limited partnership association. 138 Although
the majority conceded that these cases failed to "squarely address the
exact question posed" 139 in Carlsberg, they refused to fashion a new
rule in light of the Bouligny court's deference to congressional action. 140
While reinforcing the label theory, the Third Circuit rejected the
capacity to sue argument 141 posited by Carlsberg on appeal. The
majority criticized Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co. as containing a superficial analysis of the capacity to sue issue. 142 Troubled by
that case's reliance on New York's capacity to sue law, 14 3 the
134 Id. at 1259. The varying membership status in Chapman consisted of a president-partner
with capacity to sue, occupying one status, and non-president-partners without capacity to sue
occupying another status. Id.
135
136

Id.

Id. at 1258.
137 Id. All the partners of the limited partnership association were of equal status, while the
partners of the Carlsberg limited partnership occupied two different statuses. Id.
138

Id.

Id. at 1259.
140 Id. Carlsberg characterized the Bouligny "hands off" attitude as taking "a rather hard
139

line, demanding that existing principles respecting diversity jurisdiction be strictly followed."
Id. However, at least one commentator disagrees as to the necessity of the Bouligny "hands off"
attitude:
federal diversity jurisdiction is a constitutional grant, and the question of citizenship
can be characterized as one of constitutional construction. Absent congressional
specificity, this leaves the federal courts free to determine whether unincorporated
associations shall be deemed citizens for diversity purposes. Congress, of course,
remains free to explicitly restrict or modify any judicial extensions which it deems
unwise.
Comment, supra note 70, at 336-37.
141 554 F.2d at 1260-62.
142 Id. at 1260. However, the Carlsberg court did indicate that the Colonial Realty rationale
"that a limited partner should not be 'counted' for diversity purposes if such individual himself
has no capacity to sue or be sued on behalf of the partnership" was "easily grasped." Id.
143 Id. Since "jurisdiction is the most elemental concern of the federal courts in evaluating
the cases which come before them," the court felt that the determination as to who has capacity
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Carlsberg court discussed the interrelationship between Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 17b and 82,144 emphasizing that the existence of' diversity jurisdiction should not be determined by state
capacity to sue laws. 145 Furthermore, the court found neither judicial or congressional directives nor policy reasons for adhering to the
46
Colonial Realty rationale.'
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hunter, refusing to include limited partnerships within the all-encompassing category of unincorporated associations, 1 4 7 focused upon the limited partnership as a
"unique business entity." 148 In examining the elements of a limited
partnership 14 9 -the limited partners incapacity to sue, their lack of
authorization to control the business, and their sole function as contributors of capital 150-Judge Hunter found it inappropriate to
analogize Carlsberg to associations bearing characteristics different
from those of' limited partnerships. He found it anomalous for the
court to determine diversity jurisdiction on the basis of the citizenship of limited partners whom the court would later eliminate from
the suit because of their lack of capacity to sue and consequent inabil151
ity to participate in argument on the merits.

to sue should be addressed "only after the jurisdiction of the federal court has been firmly
established." Id.
144 Id. at 1261. Although Rule 17(b) provides that state law determines who has capacity to
sue, the Carlsberg court found that Rule to be limited by Rule 82 in that courts could not
employ it to enlarge their jurisdiction. Id.
145 Id. The court feared that consideration of state capacity to sue laws in determining diversity jurisdiction might allow the states to contract and expand federal jurisdiction through legislation. Id.
Id. at 1261-62.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1263.
149 Id. at 1263-65. Judge Hunter compared the limited partnership to the general partner'4

ship. He noted that, in determining diversity jurisdiction of a general partnership, the courts
look to state law to determine the parties and he questioned the court's refusal to treat limited
partnerships similarly. Id. at 1263.
Just as with general partnerships it was state law that informed us to count each
member's citizenship, here, too, it is state law that informs us of the nature of these
uniform limited partnerships and tells us we should look only to the general
partners, since it is the general partners who function as ordinary partners-the
limited partners are a distinct breed.
Id. at 1264-65.
150 Id. at 1265.
151 Id. Attempting to allay the majority's fear that states would legislate with a view to controlling federal jurisdiction, Judge Hunter observed that the courts have consistently exercised
their power to pierce the veil of manufactured diversity. Id. The courts' methods of dealing
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Although the majority and dissent discussed the diversity jurisdictional status of' limited partnerships at length, both focused upon
only two of the pertinent theories-the label theory and the capacity
to sue theory. Neither opinion dealt with the characteristics theory in
15 2
any great detail.
The Carlsberg court adopted a restrictive approach toward federal diversity jurisdiction by applying the concepts of limited jurisdiction, federalism and judicial economy. 153 Stressing the congressional
intent to limit federal court jurisdiction, the court failed to acknowledge those factors favoring diversity which formed the basis of the
original diversity grant, 154 and occasional congressional expansions of
that jurisdiction. 155
One enactment which courts have employed as evidence of restrictive congressional intent in the area of the diversity jurisdictional
status of unincorporated associations is the 1958 amendment to the
with manufactured diversity are best illustrated by cases involving the appointment of guardians. E.g., McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969); Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955).
152 The majority, however, appeared to have made a peripheral rejection of the characteristics theory in its discussion of Great Southern. 554 F.2d at 1258. It remains unclear whether
the majority relied upon Great Southern as a rejection of the capacity to sue theory, or as a
rejection of the characteristics theory on the basis that the characteristic of capacity to sue did
not clothe the association with an identity sufficiently similar to that of a corporation so as to
warrant entity treatment.
15 The concepts of federalism and judicial economy are the mainstays of the arguments to
abolish diversity. Frank, The American Law Institute's Proposals on the Division of Jurisdiction
between State and Federal Courts-FederalDiversity Jurisdiction-An Opposing View, 17
S.C. L. REv. 677, 680-81 (1965).
154 Fear that state courts would favor their own residents in suits against out-of-state litigants
constituted the major catalyst of the diversity grant. C. WRIGHT, supra note 34, at 85, 89;
Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 51, at 1448. One historical basis of diversity consisted of the purported necessity of diversity jurisdiction in the implementation of the privileges
and immunities clause of the United States Constitution. C. WRIGHT, supra at 90. Other factors
favoring diversity included: (1) the superiority of federal courts to state courts, id.; C.orporate
Diversity Jurisdiction, supra at 1449-50; (2) the inequity in forcing an out-of-state litigant to
litigate in an inferior court where he possesses no opportunity to work for the improvement of
that court, C. WRIGHT, supra at 90; (3) diversity jurisdiction's positive contribution to the
expansion of business, id. at 91; Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction, supra at 1448-49; (4) the
policy of encouraging state tribunals to improve their system of justice, C. WRIGHT, supra at

90-91; Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction, supra at 1450; (5) the desirability of uniformity of law,
Corporate Diversity Jurisdiction, supra at 1450.
155E.g., Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 34, at 9 (noting that Federal Interpleader Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1335 (1976), constituted an expansion of diversity jurisdiction): 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976)
(1958 amendment codifying extension of diversity jurisdiction to corporations); see note 70 supra
and accompanying text. Congress has periodically expanded and then contracted different aspects
of diversity jurisdiction, e.g., removal jurisdiction, venue provisions, amount in controversy. Diversity Jurisdiction, supra at 6-9.
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diversity statute, section 1332(c). 1 56 While confirming the Marshall
grant of corporate entity status for diversity purposes, this amendment indisputably limited the scope of corporate access to federal
court.' 5 7 Section 133 2(c), however, does not address the diversity
status of unincorporated associations, 158 and therefore, lends no support to the Carlsberg court's denial of diversity jurisdiction to the
limited partnership. Congress recently considered several bills which
proposed the abolition of diversity jurisdiction. 159 Yet, to date, Congress has not abolished diversity jurisdiction and it, therefore, still
60
survives with some growth and contraction as Congress sees fit.1
The Carlsberg court's restrictive approach toward determining
the jurisdictional status of the limited partnership parallels the position assumed by the Deveaux Supreme Court in denying corporations
entity treatment. However, the Letson and Marshall courts corrected
Deveaux's narrow holding by granting corporations the full benefit of
the diversity statute. Irrespective of the dilfering views as to the validity of the diversity statute, as long as Congress has addressed the
diversity issue and has not limited it to corporations, diversity jurisdiction should be as accessible to unincorporated associations as it is
to corporations. Access to federal court on a diversity basis should not
depend on incorporation or lack thereof. Therefore, Carlsberg could
have followed the lead of the Letson and Marshall decisions in determining the diversity status of the limited partnership by way of
one of four alternate paths. First, it might have granted absolute entity treatment to all unincorporated associations on the basis of the

156 R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 336 F.2d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 1964). Cf. Baer

v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 503 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1974); Jim Walter Investors v.
Empire-Madison, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 425, 428 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (citing Bouligny as an explication
of Congress' intent in enacting section 1332(c)).

151See notes 68-71 supra and accompanying text.
"' The amendment operated as a redefinition of the term citizenship for purposes of corporations and not as a total revamping of the term within the sphere of diversity jurisdiction. 65
COLUM. L. REv. 162, 166-67 (1965).
159During the 1977-1978 congressional session, two bills were proposed to abolish diversity
jurisdiction, H.R. 761, H.R. Rep. No. 761, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977) and H.R. 9622,
H.R. REP. No. 9622, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 248-51 (1977). Three other bills proposed to limit
federal diversity jurisdiction. H.R. 9123, H.R. Rep. No. 9123, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26
(1977) and H.R. 7243, H.R. Rep. No. 7243, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1977) "preclud[ed] a plaintiff
from invoking [diversity] jurisdiction in any district court located in a state of which he is a
citizen." H.R. Rep. No. 7243, supra at 23 (letter, Sept. 14, 1977). H.R. 5546, H.R. Rep. No.
5546, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6 (1977) embodied the ALl proposed capacity to sue hybrid
approach.
160 See note 155 supra.
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same considerations which Marshall stressed in allowing corporations
access to federal court. 16 1 If unincorporated associations were to receive entity treatment, the determination of the associations' diversity
status, consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), would focus on either the
unincorporated associations' state of' organization and/or its state of
principal place of business. Second, the court could have determined
162
on a case-by-case basis whether the particular type of association,
the limited partnership, possessed characteristics sufficiently similar
to a corporation so as to entitle it to entity treatment. 1 63 As a third
alternative, the majority might have employed the capacity to sue
theory advocated by both Carlsberg and Judge Hunter in his dissent.
By this approach, only the citizenship of those association members
with capacity to sue would affect the existence of diversity.1 6 4 Fourth,
the court could have utilized an approach, as put forth by the American Law Institute (ALI), which combines entity treatment with the
capacity to sue theory. The ALl approach examines whether an unincorporated association is "capable of suing or being stied as an entity in

the state where an action is brought." 165 Where state law provides for
suability as an entity, the unincorporated association would "be
deemed a citizen of the state where it has its principal place of business." 166
161 53 GEO. L.J. 513, 517-18 (1965). The Marshall court stressed considerations of state
prejudice, implementation of the privileges and immunities clause, and the right of a citizen
who has dealt with an association as an entity to sue the association as an entity. 57 U.S. at
326-29.
162 This case-by-case basis could focus upon the type of unincorporated association, granting
diversity jurisdiction to, for example, all limited partnerships. Alternatively it could focus on
each individual limited partnership, examining beyond the type of association into such characteristics as the size of the limited partnership, and susceptibility to state prejudice.
'8
See notes 64-67, 83-92, 102-108 supra and accompanying text.
6 See notes 117-120 supra and accompanying text.
165 ALl STUDY, supra note 46, at 114.
166 Id.; see note 118 supra. Two methods for determining the state of an association's business are: "The 'nerve-center' approach [which] seeks to ascertain the locus of control of multistate operations . . . [and the] combination of factors approach [which] includ[es] the percentages
of assets, employees, and income derived within a particular state." Comment, supra note 70,
at 345 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). For a further discussion of these methods, see
id. at 345-48. The ALl proposal would increase an unincorporated association's initial access to
federal court. However, section 1302(b)(2) acts as a check on this increased access by providing
that corporations and unincorporated associations cannot invoke federal diversity jurisdiction in
a state where they have maintained a local establishment for more than two years. ALl STUDY,
supra note 46, at 125-26. The purpose of section 1302(b)(2) is
to limit the ability of a corporation or other business organization to claim the
stranger's right to a federal forum in a state where it has engaged in regular business activity to a sufficient extent to warrant its being treated as domesticated.
Id. at 125.
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The first alternative presents a desirable approach in that the
same considerations favoring corporate entity status also apply to unincorporated associations. Furthermore, this alternative would alleviate the artificial label distinction between unincorporated and incorporated associations. 16 7 However, the Supreme Court decisions
of Chapman, Great Southern and Bouligny appear to negate such a
result.
The case-by-case limitation of the characteristics theory better
serves the policy of limited jurisdiction, 1 68 while granting diversity
jurisdiction in accordance with the prevailing case law. The Carlsberg
court could have distinguished the Chapman, Great Southern, and
Bouligny cases as factually inapposite, while paralleling the charac1 69
teristics of the Russell sociedad to those of the limited partnership.
The Chapman case involved a joint stock company whose members, unlike the Carlsberg limited partners, bore equal liability and
exercised equal control of their respective associations. 170 The limited partners in Carlsberg were characterized by the limited role of
contributors of capital, possessing no control of the business, and lacking capacity to sue. 1 71 Despite these distinctions, the Carlsberg
court construed Chapman as standing for the proposition that "varying membership status should not bear on the fundamental inquiry
whether diversity exists."172 However, the two levels of membership status in Chapman were 'held to differ only in their capacity to
117 See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 78, § 26A, at 151 (limited partnership associations
resemble corporations); id. § 34, at 178 (joint stock companies resemble corporations). For an
example of the artificiality of the label distinction, compare R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United
Steelworkers, 336 F.2d 160, 161-64 (4th Cir. 1964) (where court employed label theory to deny
unincorporated labor union entity treatment) with Rew v. International Organization, Masters,
Mates & Pilots, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 542, 545-46 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (where court distinguished
Bouligny as determining citizenship of unincorporated labor union, and applied label theory to
grant diversity jurisdiction to incorporated labor union).
168 However, the characteristics theory would thwart the policy of judicial economy since it
requires federal courts to determine the characteristics of the individual association on an ad
hoc basis. Comment, supra note 70, at 337.
169 "The histories of the civil law partnership in commendam and the common law limited
partnership reveal the fact of common institutional ancestry." Comment, PartnershipIn
Commendam-Louisiana's Limited Partnership, 35 TUL. L. REV. 815, 815 (1961). New York Law,
on which the Uniform Limited Partnership Act was based, modelled its enactment along the
lines of the French law. Id. at 817. For a discussion of the similarities and differences between
the common law limited partnership and the civil law sociedad en comandita, see Comment,
Symposium: A Survey of the Louisiana Law of Partnership, 45 TUL. L. REv. 329, 361-64
(1971); Comment, supra at 815-27.
170 See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 78, § 34, at 178-79.

171 554 F.2d at 1265.
172 Id. at 1259; see note 134 supra and accompanying text.
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sue while the two-level partnership of Carlsberg was attended by the
additional distinctions of differing degrees of liability, differing levels
of control of the business, and distinctions in their capacity to sue.
Thus, any analogy between the two cases appears to be tenuous at
best.
Great Southern can be specifically distinguished from Carlsberg
in as much as the former case involved a limited partnership association, while the latter case dealt with a limited partnership. The two
types of associations are similar in that the limited partners in both
associations bear limited liability. However, the limited partnership
association is only comprised of limited partners with equal limited
liability, 173 whereas the Carlsberg limited partnership is composed of
both general and limited partners with distinctive roles within the
association. 174
In Bouligny, the Court barred the unincorporated labor union
from federal court essentially because it feared the prospect of deciding in which state a national labor union was organized, and/or had its
principal place of business for diversity purposes. 175 The Carlsberg
court could have distinguished the Bouligny holding as one tailored to
the unique problems of a union "with its complicated structure of
locals and internationals,"176 therefore, finding it inapplicable to the
limited partnership.
The precedential value of the Russell case depends upon several
factors: whether the Court intended to deal solely with a civil law
association; 177 whether Congress' action in amending section 1332
evidenced an intent to circumvent Russell; '78 and whether the fact
that Russell involved an issue only analogous to diversity jurisdiction
1 79
precluded its application to the Carlsberg case.

173 CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 78, § 26A, at 151.
174 554 F.2d at 1255.
175 382 U.S. at 152.
176 Currie, supra note 34, at 35.

177 Bouligny limited Russell to the civil law area. 382 U.S. at 151; see text accompanying note
113 supra.
178 "Bouligny also argued that even if Russell could be interpreted as a departure from the
traditional view, it was overruled for diversity purposes by the 1958 amendment to section
1332." Comment, supra note 70, at 335 (footnote omitted); 336 F.2d at 164. Although the
amendment to the diversity statute was designed to decrease the caseload of the federal courts,
it was only intended to " 'reduc[e] the number of cases involving corporations which cane into
Federal District Courts on the fictional premise that a diversity of citizenship exists.' " Comment, supra note 55, at 213; see notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
179Bouligny held that Russell involved an issue only closely analogous to diversity jurisdiction and therefore was not controlling. Comment, supra note 70, at 334; 382 U.S. at 151.
However, Mason answered Bouligny's contention:
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Those who argue for the limitation of Russell to the civil law
sphere support this proposition by referring to Russell's citation of',
but failure to overrule, Chapman,18 0 and Russell's reference to common law entity treatment as distinguishable from that of the civil
law."" There was, however, no need for Russell to overrule Chapman. 18 2 Chapman's analysis rested solely on a capacity to sue distinction between the two levels of joint stock association members. It
did not preclude the Russell characteristics analysis of the numerous
1 83
distinctions between the sociedad's limited and general partners.
The holding in Russell was not circumvented by section 1332(c)
of the diversity statute. By amending the diversity statute, Congress
did not intend to bar unincorporated associations from federal
court. 18 4 Rather, the amendment was directed toward correcting the
abuses of' manufactured corporate diversity. 18 5 The statute focused
on a specific evil that was not present in the Russell case.
In addressing the construction of the Organic Act of Puerto
Rico, 18 6 admittedly Russell involved an issue only analogous to diversity jurisdiction. 18 7 However, the Supreme Court expressed its intention to reach all facets of federal jurisdiction with its Russell holding when it stated that "an unincorporated association may be treated
as a citizen separate and distinct from its members 'Tor purposes of
federal jurisdiction.' " 188
The third alternative, the capacity to sue theory, proffered by
Carlsberg Resources Corporation and the dissent, would grant all unincorporated associations access to a federal forum. Each unincorpothe same phrase "citizens of a State" was employed by Congress in section 1332 and
the special jurisdictional statute in Russell; thus, it seems reasonable to presume
that where two statutes employ the same term for creating jurisdiction in federal
courts, the term is generic for definitional purposes.
Comment, supra note 70, at 335 (footnote omitted); 334 F.2d at 397-98.
1so Mason, 334 F.2d at 397-99; Brocki v. American Express Co., 279 F.2d 785, 788-89 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871 (1960); see 78 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1662 (1965).
1s,334 F.2d at 398-99; see 78 HA.v. L. REV. 1661, 1662 (1965).
182 334 F.2d at 398-99.
183 Id. at 399. Russell cited Chapman to indicate that for purposes of the characteristics
theory, the characteristic of capacity to sue, alone, is not sufficient to warrant entity treatment.
Id.; 78 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1662 n.4 (1965).
' See note 158 supra.
185 One abuse which the amendment intended to correct was the practice of corporations
"incorporating in a state other than the [state of their] principal place of business" so to gain
increased access to federal courts. 65 COLUM. L. REV. 162, 166-67 (1965); 34 CEO. WASH. L.
REV. 793, 795 (1966); see notes 70, 71, 158 supra.
188 Comment, supra note 74, at 1136 n.ll. For a further explanation of the facts in Russell,
see 78 HARV. L. REv. 1661, 1662 (1965).
187 Comment, supra note 74, at 1136.
18 Comment, supra note 70, at 335; see Russell, 288 U.S. at 482.
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rated association would purportedly receive aggregate treatment with
the determination of diversity jurisdiction focusing on those members
of the association with capacity to sue under state law. However, the
practical effect of this theory would vary from state to state. 189 In
those states where the association has capacity to sue in its own
name, the capacity to sue theory would actually result in entity
treatment. Where an association can only be sued in the name of one
of its officers, 19 0 the court would examine the residence of that officer
to determine diversity jurisdiction. Under Judge Hunter's analysis in
Carlsberg, the law would be uniform only in the case of the limited
partnership, where, by virtue of' the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, only the general partners possess capacity to sue. 19 ' Problems
would arise in connection with the varying state laws: associations
would favor states which grant entity treatment; courts would be
faced with the question as to whether the grant of entity treatment in
this situation should be subjected to the section 1332(c) principal
place of business limitation on diversity; and manufactured diversity
could pose a problem where state law focuses on the citizenship of an
officer of the association. A possible method of alleviating these
problems would be to limit the application of the capacity to sue
theory to limited partnerships on the basis of their unique nature.
The practical operation of the ALl capacity to sue theory would
also vary from state to state.' 92 The ALl proposal would effectively
limit the number of unincorporated associations afforded access to
federal court since it applies only to those associations which are empowered under state law to sue as entities. 193 The ALl proposal dis189

For an enumeration of the possible state law variations, see Comment, supra note 70, at

352-53.
190 Comment, supra note 70, at 353; Chapman, 129 U.S. at 682 (1889) (where association had
capacity to sue in name of president). It seems reasonable to expect that an association would
choose a president who resides outside of the association's states of organization and principal
place of business in order to bring a majority of its suits with local residents to federal court.
Such action would thwart the policies fostering diversity jurisdiction. See note 153 supra.
191 Judge Hunter appears to have taken a practical approach toward the capacity to sue issue.
554 F.2d at 1262-66. While Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2127 requires that a limited
partnership bring suit in the name of the individual partners "trading in the firm name," PA. R.
Civ. PRo. 2127, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), Rule 2128 allows
suit against the limited partnership in the firm name, PA. R. Civ. PRO. 2128, 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1975). Arguably, Rule 2128 invests a limited partnership with capacity to
be sued as an entity. However, the practical effect of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, as
indicated by Judge Hunter, is to designate only the general partners as proper parties to the
suit. 59 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 545 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). For text of § 545, see
note 3 supra. Therefore, the courts should examine the citizenship of only the general partners
in determining diversity.
192 Comment, supra note 70, at 352-53.
193 Id. at 351.
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posed of the problems of manufactured diversity and that of associations organizing in states which grant entity treatment, by focusing
not on the law of the state of organization, but on the law of the state
where suit is brought. 1 94 The ALl also designated the situs of the
association's citizenship as the state of its principal place of business. 195
Extending the application of label theory with its concomitant
aggregate result to the limited partnership, the Carlsberg court, for
the first time, resolved the question of the diversity jurisdictional
status of the limited partnership. The majority appears to have effectively overruled the capacity to sue theory by its criticism of the Colonial Realty case. In failing to address the characteristics approach of
the Russell decision, arguably the court has left one avenue open for
other courts to circumvent its holding and grant entity treatment to
the limited partnership. 196 Carlsberg, as it now stands, represents
the Deveaux of unincorporated associations. It reaps its destruction by
tempting courts to dismiss en masse cases involving limited
partnerships-cases over which the courts heretofore thought they
had jurisdiction. 197 The federal courts should take an affirmative step
in the area of the diversity status of unincorporated associations by
following the Marshall lead. The diversity jurisdictional grant exists
for natural persons and corporations, and should also exist for unincorporated associations. The label that state law attaches to an association should not determine the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction.
Georgine Natelli DeAngelis
194 ALI STUDY,

supra note 46, at 114.

195 id.

196 One case that may have made some inroads into the Carlsberg holding is National City
Bank v. Fidelco Growth Investors, 446 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In determining the
diversity status of a business trust, the court held that the issue was not whether Fidelco was a
corporation, but whether it was a conventional trust. Id. at 126. The court then proceeded to

examine the characteristics of the business trust to determine if it was sufficiently similar to a
conventional trust so as to possess citizenship only in those states where its trustees were citizens. Id. at 126-29. Since Fidelco did not possess characteristics sufficiently similar to the
conventional trust, the court examined the citizenship of all the shareholders, resulting in the
destruction of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 129.
19' Edward Hansen, Inc. v. Kearny Post Office Assocs., No. 1401-71 (D.C.N.J. Oct. 12,
1977). The KPOA case originally found its way into federal court six years ago under the Colonial Realty rationale. However, the court dismissed it on the basis of the Carlsberg holding
since some of the limited partners of the KPOA limited partnership possessed citizenship in
New Jersey, the same citizenship as that of the Hansen corporation. See Grynberg v. B.B.L.
Assocs., 436 F. Supp. 564, 567-68 (D. Colo. 1977).

